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WAIVER OF PATIENT'S PRIVILEGES
It is the purpose here to discuss the circumstances under which a
patient is deemed to have waived the privilege veiling commumcations made to his physician, paying more particular attention to the
law on that subject as it now exists in this state, in an attempt to
arrive at the every-day and practical effect of the claim of privilege upon the ascertainment of truth in the court room.
The privilege did not exist at common law as it did in cases of
commumcations between attorney and client. It seems first to
have been placed upon the statute books of this country m the State
of New York m 1831.1 Since that time, by legislative enactment in
varying forms in the different states, the rule has become almost
universal. Some of the statutes expressly provide for waiver, and
others, as in this state,2 make no mention thereof.
In an early New York cases the privilege was held to be justified
for the following reasons.
"It is a just and useful enactment introduced to give
protection to those who are in charge of physicians from
the secrets disclosed to enable them properly to prescribe
for diseases of the patient. To open the door for disclosure
of secrets revealed on the sick bed or when consulting a
physician would destroy confidence between the physician
and the patient, and it is easy to see might tend very much
to prevent the advantages and benefits which follow from
this confidential relationship."
Our statute was enacted by the territorial legislature in the year
1854. In none of the states is the statute of recent origin and usually
antedates by decades the present era where the time, if not the calendars, of our trial courts is substantially devoted to the determination of causes involving in one way or another an issue on personal
injuries. The canons of medical ethics prevent disclosure of
IN. Y. Rev. St. 1828, II, 406 (Part 3, ch. 7, Art. 9, Sec. 78).
2 Rem. Comp. Stat. Sec. 1214. The following persons shall not be examined as witnesses: 4. A regular physician or surgon shall not, without
the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending such patient, which was necessary to enable him
to prescribe for the patient.
2
Edington v. Insurance Company, 67 N. Y. 185, 194 (1876)
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patient's confidences outside of the court room. Can it be said that
the carrying of that privilege into the court room, where the patient
voluntarily elects to bare his injuries to a court and jury, is indispensible to or even justified by the fostering of freedom between
patient and physician?
An injured person's inherent desire to be cured of his injuries
or ailments will ordinarily so far outweigh any scheme to misrepresent those injuries, by withholding full disclosure to the physician,
as to render non-disclosure of the facts to the physician, present,
in only a negligible number of cases. We think it may be fairly
said that in all instances where the injuries are bona fide a full disclosure is made to the physician without any thought on the part
of the patient that the same is induced by the statutory privilege.
And yet so jealous have the courts generally been of the patient's
rights that in one case4 it was held that the exhibition of the plaintiff suffering from a very rare disease before a society of physicians,
and the publications of the account of the disease in a medical jour
nal even with the consent of the patient did not amount to a waiver
of the privilege.
The privilege finds its most frequent application in the following
sorts of litigation Personal injury actions where patient is himself
the plaintiff, actions by personal representatives or beneficiaries
under death by wrongful act statutes, will contests, actions by
beneficiaries or personal representatives on accident, health and
life policies.
In this state, at least, the use of the privilege as a sword of offense
or a vehicle for misrepresentation is hampered to a great extent in
litigation of the class first referred to by the statute' providing for
the appointment by the court from time to time of a physician to
examine the injured party for the purpose of qualifying himself
to testify concerning those injuries. No such opportunity for discovery of the truth by the adverse party exists in litigation of the
other sorts referred to.
While our statute on privilege excludes the testimony "without
the consent" of the patent, it is usually held that the consent need
not be evidenced by an affirmative act on the part of the patient,
but that the privilege may be waived by the patient's failure to
claim it during the trial. The reason for the rule excludes any idea
that it was enacted for the benefit of the physician, though some
Scher v. Metropolitan Street Railroad Company, 75 N. Y. S. 625, 71 App.
Div. 28 (1902)
5 Rem. Comp. Stat., Secs. 1230-1.
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of the cases seem to have lost sight of tins and sustained the claim
on the physician's objection.
The circumstances under which a majority of the courts have
held the privilege to be waived may be grouped as follows.
I. Before trial.
(a) By contract, such as express stipulation for waiver contamed in insurance policy application or m body of
policy,
(b) By conduct
(1) Voluntary submission to physician for examination,
(2) Taking of deposition of physician,
(3) Waiver at former trial,
(4) Requesting physician to attest will,
(5) Submitting to examination and treatment in presence of third parties not attending or assisting the
physician.
II. At the trial.
(a) Failure to claim privilege,
(b) Calling physician who was in consultation with other
physicians concerning whose testimony the privilege is
claimed,
(c) Plaintiff's voluntary testimony on direct examination as
to examination, treatment and conclusions of physician
concerning whose testimony the privilege is claimed,
(d) Calling non-professional witness to testify as to same
facts sought to be elicited from physician concerning
whose testimony privilege is claimed.
BEFORE TRIL

The courts are frequently requested to pass upon the validity of
a stipulation in an application for a policy of health and accident
insurance or life insurance, waiving in advance all provisions of law
forbidding any physician or other person who has attended or
examined the patient from discussing any knowledge or information
acquired thereby The applications are usually made a part of the
policies by their own terms, or else some such stipulation is embodied
in the policy itself. Is such a stipulation against public policy 2 The
question has been before at least twelve of the state courts and, with
the exceptions hereinafter noted, the answer has been in the nega8 Trull v. Modern Woodmen, 12 Ida. 318, 85 Pac. 1081, 10 Ann. Cas. 53
Metrovolitan L. Ins Co. v. Willis, 37 Ind. App. 48, 76 N. E. 550
(1906)
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tive6 The reasons for a waiver under such circumstances given by
the Supreme Court of Ohio in New York Life Insurance Company v.
Snyder7 are typical of those found in the decisions just referred to
"To hold otherwise would be to open wide the doors of
both fraud and suicide with respect to the procuring of life
insurance policies, and it would jeopardize the soundness
and safety of life insurance in general. No sound reason
appears why a policy of insurance, attended by an agreement, and waiver such as in this case, should not be enforced when the evidence sustains the claim that the policy
was procured by false and fraudulent statements, knowingly made, to induce the issue of the policy, when neither
the insurance company nor its agent knew of the falsity
of the statements made by the insured. To enter a judgment in favor of the insured, after excluding the evidence
of physicians with respect to his physical condition at the
time of the taking out of the policy, is not in furtherance
of justice. Surely the insurance company has a clear right
to say to an applicant for insurance, 'We will not issue a
policy of insurance to you unless you give the company full
and complete authority to acquire any information which
any physician may now possess or may hereafter possess
concerning the state of your health at the time of taking
out the policy ' "
The rule in New York, due to a statutory provision expressly declaring that a paper executed by a party prior to the trial providing
for such waiver is insufficient as a waiver, is different. 8 And in
Michigan the waiver is held invalid by reason of the stringent prohibitory terms of the Michigan statute.9
It must here be noted, however, that the practical effect of denying the waiver in the ordinary contest over a policy of health and
accident insurance, or life insurance, is not as apt to obstruct the
truth as in the ordinary case where the privilege is claimed, because
(1906) Pride v. InterstateBusiness Men's Accident Assoc., 207 Ia. 167, 216
N.W 62, 62 A. L. R. 31 (1927) Metropolitan L. Ins Co. v. Brubaker 78 Kan.
146, 96 Pac. 62, 18 L. R. A. (ns) 362; 130 Am. St. Rep. 356, 16 Ann. Cas.
267 (1908) Sovereign Camp, W W., v. Farmer 116 Miss. 626, 77 So. 655
(1917) Cromeenes v. Sovereign Camp, W W., 205 Mo. App. 416, 224 S. W
15 (1920) Bryant v. Modern Woodrnen, 86 Neb. 372, 126 N. W 621, 21 Ann.
Cas. 365, 27 L. R. A. (ns) 326 (1910) National Annuity Assoc. v. McCall,
103 Ark. 201, 146 S. W 125, 48 L. R. A. (ns) 418 (1912) Fuller v. Knights
of Pythias, 129 N. C. 318, 40 S. E. 65, 85 Am. St. Rep. 744 (1901) Maine v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N. W 749, 15 A. L. R. 1536 (1920)
The federal rule is the same, 34 Fed. 870, 11 Fed. 281.
'116 Oh. St. 693, 158 N. E. 176, 54 A. L. R. 406 (1927).
8Holden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 N. Y. 13, 58 N. E. 771 (1900).
Gilcrist v. Mystic Workers, 196 Mich. 247, 163 N. W 10 (1917)
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the companies writing these policies have their own physicians
make an examination before the policy is issued, and thus should
be in a position to fairly show assured's condition at the time the
policy was issued. Ordinarily the insurer is in a position not only
to make a full examination of the insured, but to discuss the matter with the physicians who have previously attended the applicant, and a majority of the companies recognize this by inserting
in the policies an incontestable clause having as its effect the requirement that the insurer make his investigation within a short period
or not at all. This is, however, of little solace in those cases where
the assured has misrepresented his previous history, or where only
a cursory examination has been made by the medical examiner. This
observation does not apply to those cases where the assured's physical condition after the issuance of the policy or the cause of his
death or accident is in issue. But the courts have in litigation of
this sort been unwilling to go further than to hold that the privilege
might be waived by express stipulation. So where the beneficiary
of the policy, or the personal representative of the deceased, forwards to the insurer as part of the proofs of death the physician's
certificate as to the cause thereof, that does not constitute a waiver
of the provision of the statute prohibiting the physician from disclosing information acquired by him in his professional capacity 1*
Information contained in these certificates when forwarded by the
beneficiary to the insurer in compliance with the terms of the policy, and as part of the proofs of death, is, however, admissible as
an admission against the interest of the beneficiary 11 But there
would seem to be no sound reason why the submission of a doctor's
certificate as to cause of death, with proofs of loss, should not waive
the privilege as to all information therein contained. The assured
is assumed to have contracted with knowledge that eventually this
information must be disclosed to the insurer in that manner and
the waiver is thereby implied as strongly as if it were written in
the policy
10Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Meyer, 106 Ark. 91, 152 S. W 995 (1912)
Krapp v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 143 Mich. 369; 106 N. W 1107 (1916)
Salts v. PrudentialIns. Co., 140 Mo. App. 142, 120 S. W 714 (1909) Frazter
v. MetropolitanL. Ins Co., 161 Mo. App. 709, 141 S. W 936 (1911) Hicks
v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 196 Mo. App. 162, 190 S. W 661 (1916) Red
mond v. IndustrzalBen. Assoc., 78 Hun. 104, 44 N. E. 769 (1894) Klen V.
PrudentialIns. Co., 221 N. Y. 449, 117 N. E. 942 (1917) Becker v. Metro.
politan L. Ins. Co., 43 Misc. 99, 90 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (1904).
21Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 35 L. Ed. 371, 11 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 720 (1891) Modern Woodmen v. Davs, 184 Ill. 236, 56 N. E. 300
(1900) Coscare7la v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Go., 175 Mo. App. 130, 157 S. W
873 (1913).
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Frequently it happens that the plaintiff in a personal injury
action consents to his examination prior to trial by a physician of
his adversary's choosing. This voluntary submission to a physician
for examination happens in those cases where the plaintiff has nothing to conceal. Strictly this situation does not involve a waiver of
the privelege because the information gained by the examiner is
not for the purpose of treating the patient, but for the purpose of
qualifying him to testify 12
It would seem that the application by a plaintiff prior to trial
for a commission to take the deposition of plaintiff's attending
physician, and the actual taking of that deposition, either on oral
or written interrogatories, would consitute a waiver of any right
to claim the privilege later as to the testimony so disclosed. The
only case found on that point so holds.13
Where the privilege is waived by the patient at a former trial
involving the same facts, it would seem to be clear on principle
that it could not again be claimed at the second trial. The first
disclosure obviates any reason for further secrecy However, the
authorities seem to be equally divided, or nearly so, upon this question. Supporting the view that a waiver at one time is a waiver
for all time are decisions from the appellate courts of Missouri,
New York, and Massachusetts.1
Those decisions expressing a contrary view come from the courts of Iowa and Michigan.1' 5
Apparently all the cases hold that the testator's request to his
physician to attest his will is a waiver of secrecy and confidence as
to that matter, including the mental condition of the testator at
the time of the will's execution. The point has been expressly passed
on in this state.1 6 The matter has its analogy in the attestation of
wills by attorneys, which has become such a frequent occurrence
that it never occurs to the practitioner that there is any question
of privilege or waiver thereof concerned in his testimony upon the
17
proof of a will.
Where the communications are openly made to the physician in
11McGuire v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 178 S. W (Mo.) 79 (1915)

Casson v.

Schoenfeld, 166 Wisc. 401, 166 N. W 23 (1918)

Clifford v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 188 N. Y. 349, 80 N. E. 1094 (1907).
Elliott v. Kansas City, 96 S. W (Mo.) 1025 (1906) McKinney v. Grand
Street, etc., R. Co., 104 N. Y. 352, 10 N. E. 544 (1887) Green v. Crapo, 181
Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902)
,1Burgess v. Simms Drug Co., 114 Ia. 275, 86 N. W 307 (1901) Brzesenmester v. Supreme Lodge K. of P., 81 Mich. 525, 45 N. W 977 (1890).
1 Points v. Nier 91 Wash. 20, 157 Pac. 44 (1916).
2"4 Jones' Commentaries on the Law of Evidence (1914 Ed.) Sec. 756.
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the presence of third parties under circumstances creating no injunction of secrecy, the rule is not applicable.18 This applies, of
course, to those cases where the third parties are not present in the
capacity of assistant to the attending physician, or in some other
professional capacity, such as nurse.
AT THE TRIAL

Although the statutes in a good many states, including Wash-

mgton, prohibit the physician testifying without the "consent" of
the patient, the almost universal rule is that consent is implied from
the patient's failure to object to physician's testimony at the trial.
This has been so decided in this state, 9 and has been adhered to in
a large number of other jurisdictions 20 with but few exceptions. 2 1
The majority view is that the patient's waiver of the privilege
regarding confidential communications as to one physician waives
it at to the remainder of the physicians who attended such patient
in consultation together. The reason for this has been stated to be
"as to all witnesses of the transaction it is fully open to investigation if opened at all by the party having a right to keep it closed.
A patient cannot elect which witnesses shall be heard and which
shall not, for if one's investigation legitimately begins it continues
to the end. A patient may enforce secrecy if he chooses, but where
he himself removes the obligation he cannot avail himself of the
statute to exclude witnesses to the occurrence."122 This rule is adhered to also in New York, 22 Wisconsin, 24 and Missouri. 2 5
Where the testimony of physicians not in consultation, but
attending the patient at different times, is involved, the rule is oppo"Gleason v. Jones, 79 Okla- 191, 192 Pac. 303 (1920) Baumbann v.
Steingester 213 N. Y. 328, 107 N. E. 578 (1915) Scott v. Aultman, 211 Il.
612, 71 N. E. 1112 (1904) Ruiz v. Dow, 113 Cal. 490, 45 Pac. 867 (1896)
Mobile & M. R. Co. v. Yeats, 67 Ala. 164 (1880) Hills v. State, 61 Neb. 589,
85 N. W 836 (1901).
1° Williams v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co., 42 Wash. 597, 600, 84 Pac. 1129
(1906) State v. Frye, 45 Wash. 645, 647, 89 Pac. 170 (1907).
' Lnssak v. Croker Estate Co., 119 Cal. 442, 51 Pac. 688 (1897) Brzesen.
metster v. Supreme Lodge K. P., 81 Mich. 525, 45 N. W 977 (1890) May v.
Northern P R. Co., 32 Mont. 522, 81 Pac. 328 (1905) Patten v. United Life
& Acct. Ins. Assoc., 133 N. Y. 450, 31 N. E. 342 (1892) Hoyt v. Hoyt, 112
N. Y. 493, 20 N. E. 402 (1889) Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. 637 (1835)
Deutsch-mann v. Third Ave. 1?. Co., 87 App. Div. 503, 84 N. Y. Supp. 887
(1903).
nPenn.R. Co. v. Durkee, 78 C. C. A. 107, 147 Fed. 99 (1906)
" Lane v. .Boycourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N. E. 1111 (1891).
Capron v. Douglas, 193 N. Y. 11, 85 N. E. 827 (1908).
Cretney v. Woodmen Acc. Co., 196 Wis. 29, 219 N. W 488 (1928).
"Epstetn.v. Penn. R. Co., 250 Mo. 1, 156 S. W 699 (1913).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
site. In such a case it is the majority rule that the calling of a
physician by the patient to testify as to what he saw and did, and
the conclusions he arrived at on one occasion, does not waive the
privilege as to a physician who perhaps saw and did the same things
and came to the same conclusion three or four days later. The
ground of the distinction has been placed upon the willingness of
the patient to waive the objection as to a particular physician m
whom he reposes confidence, and his unwillingness to waive his
objection as to another who treated him at a different time for the
trouble complained of.2 6 This logic seems to be adopted by the
courts of Arkansas, 27 California,28 Idaho, 29 Indiana,"0 Iowa 3 1 and
Michigan 2 2 On the other hand the courts of New York, 3 Missouri3 '
and Kansas" have adopted the far more logical and appealing rule
that a waiver as to the testimony of one physician is a waiver as to
the testimony of all, even though the treatment is at different times.
In McPherson v. Harvey, supra, it is stated.

"When the patient for the purpose of gain or advantage
discloses the nature and secret of his malady he renounces
his statutory privilege and opens the door to a full judicial
inquiry into the subject matter of his own importation into
the case, and where several physicians have treated the
patient for the same trouble, it can make no difference
that their treatment was at different dates."
PLAINTIFF'S VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY ON DIRECT EXAMINATION AS TO
EXAMINATION, TREATMENT AND CONCLUSIONS OF PHYSICIANS
WHOSE TESTIMONY Is SOUGHT TO BE EXCLUDED.
Where the patient on direct examination voluntarily assumes to
describe his condition and to detail the examination and treatment

given him by his physician, then there is no further need to close
"Jacobs v. Cedar Rapids, 181 Ia. 407, 164 N. W 891 (1917)

Missouri

N. A. R. Co. v. Daniels, 97 Ark. 352, 136 S. W 651 (1911)

Missouri &N. A. R. Co. v. Daniels, 98 Ark. 352, 136 S. W 651 (1911).
"Hirschberg v. Southern P Co., 180 Cal. 774, 183 Pac. 141 (1919).
"Jones v. Caldwell, 20 Ida. 5, 116 Pac. 110 (1911).
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fletcher American Nat. Bank, 85 Ind. App. 563,

150 N. E. 825 (1925) superseding former opinion in 148 N. E. 501.
1Jacobs v. Cedar Rapids, 181 Ia. 407, 164 N. W 891 (1917).
"Slater v. Sorge, 166 Mich. 173, 131 N. W 565 (1911)

Capron v. Douglas,193 N. Y. 11, 85 N. E. 827 (1908)

Hethier v. Johns,

233 N. Y. 370, 135 N. E. 603 (1922)

"McPherson v. Harvey, 183 S. W (Mo.) 653 (1916)

Michaels v. Har-

vey, 179 S. W (Mo.) 735 (1915) State v. Long, 257 Mo. 199, 165 S. W 748
(1914).
-Chaffee v. Kauffman, 113 Kan. 254, 214 Pac. 618 (1923)

PATIENT'S PRIVILEGES
the physician's lips. If the patient goes into detail regarding the
nature of his injuries, testifying as to what the physician did while
in attendance, or relates what he communicated to the physician,
the privilege is waived, 36 but the courts are not inclined to extend
the rule. The testimony must be voluntary and not that given on
7
cross-examination.
The rule has its further restrictions in that there is no waiver
where the plaintiff merely testifies generally as to his condition in
attempting to detail the physician's treatment, without reference
to what the attending physician may have said or done.88 It seems
that unless the defense is so fortunate as to be confronted with a
plaintiff who, on direct examination, is taken through a detailed
statement of his injuries, physician's treatment, and probably the
physician's directions to the patient, then there is no waiver.
It has been said that the rule is different in malpractice cases,
and that the bringing of the action itself constitutes a waiver.8 9 The
weight of authority is, however, that malpractice cases, like other
cases involving personal injuries, do not of necessity involve the
waiver of the privilege, and that it is only deemed waived upon a
voluntary detailed disclosure by plaintiff. 40 It would seem extremely unfair by a claim of privilege in malpractice case to prevent
the defendant from testifying in his own behalf, and as a matter
of practice this never occurs, because the plaintiff, in order to
recover, must open the door to that testimony either by himself or
through witnesses, in detailing the acts of negligence.
Where a non-professional witness is present at the time of the
examination of the patient, and his treatment by the physician, and
is called by the plaintiff to testify as to what was there said and
done, the privilege as to those physicians present at least is waived.41
'Opstezn v. Penn. 1?. Co., 250 Mo. 1, 156 S. W 699 (1913) Woods v.
Lisbon, 150 Ia. 433 ,130 N. W 372 (1911) Treanor v. Manhattan R. Co.,
16 N.
Y. Supp. 536 (1891).
2
Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345, 265 Pac. 1082 (1828) Burgess a'.
Simms Drug Co., 114 Ia. 275, 86 N. W 307 (1901) May v. Northern Pac. R.
Co., 32 Mont. 522, 81 Pac. 328 (1905).
'Noelle v. Hoqusam Lumber & Shtngle Co., 47 Wash. 519, 92 Pac. 372
(1908) Williams v. Johnson, 112 Ind. 273, 13 N. E. 872 (1887) McAllister
v. St. Paul City R. Co., 105 Minn. 1, 116 N. W 917 (1908) Green V. NebagMain, 113 Wis. 508, 89 N. W 520 (1902).
"Beckwell v. Hosser, 10 Ind. App. 5, 37 N. E. 580 (1894) 4 Wigmore
on Evidence (2d. Ed.) See. 2389, p. 3359.
'OPackard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345, 265 Pac. 1082 (1928) Capron v'.
Douglas, 193 N. Y. 11, 85 N. E. 827 (1908)
"'Woodsv'. Ihsbon, 150 Ia. 433, 130 N. W 372 (1911) Reed v. Rex Fuel
Co., - Ia. -, 141 N. W 1056 (1913).
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THE WASHINGTON CASES

The majority of the questions we have been considering have
never been before the Supreme Court of this state.
Williams v. Spokane Falls & N R. C0.42 held that a patient in a
personal injury suit waives the privilege attached to the statements
of his physician where he permits him to testify without objection.
Noelle v. Hoquiam Lumber & Shingle

C0o.

4

is an illustration of

the majority rule that a delineation by the patient of the nature of
his injuries without in addition thereto giving testimony as to what
the physician did for him, is insufficient to show a waiver. The
attending physician died prior to trial, and defendant sought to
elicit from his two consultants testimony as to the extent of plaintiff's injuries. The court said
"It is perhaps true, as argued by appellant, that the
injured party and the attending physician may be the
only persons who have knowledge of the extent of an injury
and that if the physician may not testify thereto great injustice may be done. This, of course, argues against the
policy of the statute which rests with the legislature and

not with the courts, and would yield the provisions of the
statute entirely "
There is a strong and very appealing dissent to this decision by
Justice Root, concurred in by the Chief Justice.
In Blackwell v Seattle,44 a physician was called on behalf of defendant who testified he had treated plaintiff and was then asked
to describe her condition, upon which counsel for plaintiff stated
that he had a right to object to the testimony on the ground that
the relations between the witness and the plaintiff were confidential,
but that if the physician desired to violate that confidence the
plaintiff would not ob3ect on that ground. The physician thereupon declined to testify The Supreme Court sustained the trial
court's ruling in excluding the evidence on the ground that the
patient had not consented to the physician's testimony The court
in this case was under a misapprehension as to the reason for the
rule and the effect was to permit the physician to claim the benefit
of a ruling which was not enacted for his benefit, and to permit the
plaintiff to masquerade before the jury in the guise of one willing
to make a full and complete disclosure.
242 Wash. 597, 600, 84 Pac. 1129 (1906)
"47 Wash. 519, 92 Pac. 372 (1907).
4"97 Wash. 679, 682, 167 Pac. 53 (1917).
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In In re Vaughn's Estate5 it seems to be intimated that the
physician as well as the patient may claim the privilege. This, of
course, is not warranted by the statute, and should not be confused
with another statute,48 providing that a regular physician may be
protected from testifying as to information received from any defendant by virtue of his profession. This latter section applies
specifically to criinnal cases, while the statute with which we are
here dealing is by its own terms applicable alone to civil cases,
and would have no bearing upon a criminal action but for that portion of our code 47 making the rules of evidence in civil actions applicable to those in criminal prosecutions.
State v. Mler 8 is illustrative of the protections sometimes
thrown about a patient in the use of his privilege. The defendant
was charged with a statutory crime upon the person of a minor
girl. The state sought to introduce the testimony of a physician
who had previously attended the defendant, to the effect that at the
time of the offense he was afflicted with a loathsome disease. This
was on the theory that the defendant had waived the privilege by his
own voluntary disclosures to others that he was afflicted with that
disease near the time of the alleged commission of the offense. The
court said.
"We think a patient's consent to his physician testifying
cannot be shown solely by the testimony of witnesses concernmg the patient's previous admissions or disclosures.
No decision has come to our attention holding that such is
the law It seems to us that the consent must be evidenced
to te trial court by some word or act of the patient at the
time of the trial, so that the court can conclusively know,
without depending upon the veracity of third persons as
witnesses, that the defendant has waived the privilege
accorded to him by the statute."
While some of this language may not be strictly necessary to a
decision on the point there presented, it seems clear from our previous discussion that the cases do not go to the extent of holding that
the waiver "must be evidenced to the trial court by some word or
act of the patient at the time of the trial." This is recognized by
our Supreme Court in a case involving the privilege attendant upon
the relation of attorney and client, where it was held that the rule
137 Wash. 512, 517, 242 Pac. 1094 (1926)
"Rem. Comp. Stat. Sec 2147.
Comp. Stat. Sec. 2152.
"State v. Miller, 105 Wash. 745, 178 Pac. 459 (1919).

47Rem.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
has no application to conversations at which a third party is present.49 This case holds that testimony of a plaintiff-patient elicited
on cross-examination is not voluntary, and is therefore not a waiver,
and while alluding to it does not decide the question of whether
the privilege may be waived by the personal representative of the
deceased, though it seems to have been held by the Supreme Court
in another case" that the privilege may be not waived.
As closely related to the subject under discussion it may be stated
that our Supreme Court has held that the privilege extends to
X-rays taken by plaintiff's physician,51 and that no adverse comment may be made upon the patient's claim of privilege by the adverse party 52
CONCLUSION

Can any sound reason, other than the statutory prohibition, be
urged for permitting a plaintiff or his representative, who has voluntarily presented to the court as a basis for damage a set of facts
involving his physical condition, and which must of necessity, before recovery can be had, be thoroughly detailed to the court, to
claim as confidential disclosures, the very matters which form the
basis of his recovery 9 There is no shame attached to an injured
person's condition or its treatment by one's physician which public
policy demand be kept secret. Our ills are commonly the property
of not only the immediate family but our friends. Can it be said
that freedom of disclosure between patient and physician is fostered by attaching to that relationship an imaginary secrecy which
does not in-fact exist 9 The objections to the rule have been best
stated by Professor Wigmore
"By any other conclusion the law practically permits the
plaintiff to make a claim somewhere as follows 'One
month ago I was by the defendant's negligence severely
injured in the spine and am consequently unable to walk,
I tender witnesses A, B and C, who will openly prove the
severe nature of my injury
But stay I Witness D, a
physician, is now, I perceive, called by the opponent to
prove that my injury is not so severe as I claim, I object
to his testimony because it is extremely repugnant to me
10State v. Falsetta,43 Wash. 159, 162, 86 Pac. 168 (1906).
50Points v. Nier 91 Wash. 20, 157 Pac. 44 (1916)
c Hansen v. Sandvik, 128 Wash. 60, 62, 222 Pac. 225 (1924)
rlLane v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co., 21 Wash. 119, 127, 57 Pac. 367
(1899) Strafford v. N. P R. Co., 95 Wash. 450, 454, 164 Pac. 71 (1917)
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that my neighbors should learn of my injury, and I can
keep it forever secret if the court will forbid his testimony ' If the utter absurdity of this statement (which is
virtually that of every such claimant) could be heightened
by anything, it would be by the circumstances (frequently
observable) that the dreaded disclosure, which the privilege prevents, is the fact that the plaintiff has suffered no
injury at all. In actions for personal injury, the permission to claim the privilege is a burlesque upon logic and
justice. In actions upon insurance policies, where fraudulent misrepresentations as to health are in issue, the insured's initial conduct in volunteering a supposedly full
avowal of his state of health has put him in the position of abandoning any desire to be secretive towards the
insurer on that subject, and of giving the insurer in fairness the right to ascertain the truth, and a53waiver should
be predicated by the nature of the action."1
It is submitted that, as suggested by Professor Wigmore in another place,54 the bringing of an action in which an essential part of
the issue is the existence of a physical ailment, should of itself constitute the patient's consent to the physician's testimony Were
the question a new one this could be accomplished by judicial construction, for it is getting no further afield to say that the privilege
is waived where the patient discloses the privileged matter in his
testimony than in his complaint. But the rule has apparently
become too well established judicially now to admit of any change
other, perhaps, than a statutory one.
DE WOLFE EmoRY.. *

534 Wiginore on Evidence (2d Ed.), Sec. 2389, p. 3359.
114 Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) p. 3558.
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